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Abstract
This special collection examines insurance as an increasingly central mechanism in
shaping how the effects of climate change are transforming local economies and
ways of life. The papers study a range of exemplary cases, ranging from agricul-
tural micro-insurance in development policy and regional sovereign risk facilities
in theCaribbean to public and private insurance in theUnited States.This framing
essay situates these papers in a longer tradition of scholarship on the government of
risk and security. It also describes three themes that run through the papers: the
economization of climate change; the moral economy of risk and responsibility;
and the plasticity of insurance as an abstract technology that may be taken up in
various governmental assemblages, in the name of various political projects.
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In the last decade, as multilateral political efforts have failed to cap carbon emis-
sions at levels that might prevent massive climate change, experts, officials and
activists around the world have turned to the problem of adapting to transform-
ations and upheavals that seem inevitable. Indeed, ongoing climate change is
already shaping economic and social life in multiple ways and at multiple
scales. Though individual events cannot be readily attributed to climate
change, scientific assessments are increasingly confident and specific in antici-
pating how climate change will play out in particular places (IPCC, 2018; US
Global Change Research Program, 2018). But there is nothing deterministic
about the effects of these changes on global economies or local ways of life.
Rather, these effects are being channelled by institutional mechanisms and pol-
itical decision-making.
This special section examines one mechanism through which the effects of
climate change are being channelled that promises to be of growing importance
in coming years: the financial sector, and within this sector, insurance and rein-
surance. In part, the effects of climate change are channelled through existing
lines of insurance: more frequent and intense catastrophic events increase pay-
outs on various kinds of insurance and threaten the solvency of both individual
insurers and broader pools of financial capital. The result may be dramatically
increasing premiums or the withdrawal of insurance cover from particular perils
and geographical areas (a prospect that was recently discussed in the aftermath
of devastating fires in California and other western US states in 2018 and 2020,
as well as in bushfire-affected parts of Australia in 2019–2020; see Butler, 2020;
Kaufman & Roston, 2020; Lucas & Booth, 2020; Walsh, 2018). At the same
time, the effects of climate change are being channelled through a range of
instruments that both private and public insurers and reinsurers are using to
assess catastrophe risks (such as risk mapping and catastrophe modelling),
and to manage this risk. Techniques for managing climate risk range from
novel financial instruments offered by private insurers and other financial ser-
vices entities, such as micro-insurance, index insurance, and catastrophe bonds,
to public regulation and reinsurance or other governmental backstops.
The papers in this collection take stock of this rapidly changing and still
emergent terrain by examining particular geographical locales, institutional set-
tings and technical arrangements of catastrophe insurance as they intersect with
climate change: agricultural micro-insurance in development policy, particu-
larly in Africa (Johnson); regional sovereign risk facilities in the Caribbean
(Grove); urban resilience initiatives in US cities (Collier and Cox); risk assess-
ment and rate making in public flood insurance (Elliott); and catastrophe mod-
elling of private wind insurance (Gray). These papers investigate the technical
issues that are arising and the governmental devices that are being invented and
deployed, as both public and private insurers work to assess and distribute cat-
astrophe risk. Thus, on the one hand, they examine how uncertain future cat-
astrophes are rendered knowable and governable in the present; how climate
change risks are reflected in existing lines of insurance; and the new insurance
and quasi-insurance instruments that are being developed to manage
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increasingly pervasive and costly catastrophe risk. On the other hand, the
papers ask how insurance is shaping the political landscape of risk, vulnerability
and responsibility in the Anthropocene today. How does insurance constitute
collectivities or publics around climate risks? How does private insurance inter-
act with public security mechanisms, whether through public regulation or
public backstops for private insurance, or through private insurance cover
for public functions? How does insurance distribute both exposure to climate
risks and new forms of security?
Catastrophe insurance and climate change: An emerging
assemblage
Discussion of climate change and insurance is not new. The first assessment of
the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), released in 1990, noted that
insurance could serve a double function, both providing signals about risks (that
might affect the decisions of businesses or homeowners to locate in a floodplain,
for example) and offering an ‘effective means of reducing the economic impact
of losses’ (IPCC, 1990, p. 184). Five years later, the 1995 IPCC Report on the
Social and Economic Impacts of Climate Change detailed various ways that
private and public insurance mechanisms could interact with climate change.
These included incorporating changing risks into insurance premiums, limiting
financial exposure of both private and public entities to catastrophe risks,
expanding risk pools through cooperation between government and actors in
the financial services industry, and advocating for risk mitigation beyond insur-
ance, to limit the exposure of public and private insurers (Bruce et al., 1995).
But over the next two decades, despite selective action by a handful of large
insurance companies (most notably European reinsurers like Munich Re and
Swiss Re), the insurance industry’s response was relatively meagre. A 2012
report by Ceres, a corporate sustainability watchdog, found that few insurers
had ‘explicit policies to identify or manage the trends of global climate
change’, adding that many did not ‘seem to understand the difference
between climate variability and climate change’ (Ceres, 2012).
This picture has changed dramatically in the last several years. Initiatives
relating to insurance and climate change have rapidly proliferated, often
through collaborations between national governments, multilateral organiz-
ations, non-profits and foundations, and private insurers. Participants in
these initiatives range from the United Nations and the World Bank, which
supports a range of national and regional catastrophe insurance programmes,
a global index insurance facility, and a host of micro-insurance programmes,
to foundations such as the Clinton Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation,
whose 100 Resilient Cities programme defined a central role for private
insurers, both as sources of authoritative risk assessment and as providers of
new risk transfer arrangements. Pointing to statements emerging from the
Paris Climate Change conference, and to the ‘InsurResilience’ initiative
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launched by the leaders of the G7, which pledged to extend insurance to 400
million people in poor countries by 2020, Surminski, Bouwer and Linner-
ooth-Bayer (2016) asked whether 2015 was the ‘year of climate insurance’. In
these new initiatives, the emphasis has shifted, at least on the level of rhetoric,
from the health of the insurance industry to the role of insurance in governing
the risks associated with climate change. This new orientation was articulated
by UN Environment Chief Erik Solnheim when he introduced a new pro-
gramme of the UN Environment’s Finance Initiative to partner with global
insurers and reinsurers to better manage their own risk in November 2018.
‘An uninsurable world’, Solnheim wrote, ‘is a price that society could not
afford. This is why UN Environment is working with leading insurers to
understand and reduce risk, to seize unprecedented business opportunities in
climate action, and to ensure an insurable, resilient and sustainable world’
(Gallin, 2018).
One significant driver of this recent attention to catastrophe insurance and
climate change has been the private insurance industry itself. Its motivation
is hardly mysterious. Insurers are massively exposed to risks associated with
climate change. Such risks to the insurance industry have increasingly drawn
the attention of ratings agencies, which conclude that the effects of climate
change ‘will magnify the volatility for these firms and result in a number of
risk management challenges’ (Moody’s, 2018). Pay-outs from existing lines
of insurance are increasing dramatically (See Figure 1). Swiss Re’s 2018
Sigma study reported that disasters produced a record $144 billion in
insured losses and $337 billion in economic losses (versus 10-year averages of
$58 billion and $190 billion, respectively) that were largely concentrated in
the southeast United States and the Caribbean (Swiss Re Institute, 2018).
Although not all of these losses are weather-related, insurers link the dramatic
increase of loss to climate change, and anticipate that, due to climate change,
Figure 1 Insured losses, 1970–2020, in US$ billion at 2020 prices
Source: Swiss Re Institute (2020). News release nr-20201215-sigma-full-year-2020-pre-
liminary-natcat-loss-estimates. Reprinted with permission.
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losses will continue to increase dramatically in the future. Industry groups, con-
sortia of regulators and initiatives of multilateral organizations (such as the
UNEP Finance Initiative, mentioned above) also warn that ever-more frequent
and intense storms, floods, heat waves and droughts present systemic risks to
the insurance industry, and threaten to render certain risks uninsurable.
At the same time, private insurance companies and other actors in the finan-
cial services industry see climate change as an unprecedented business oppor-
tunity and imagine an expansive role for themselves in assessing and managing
the risks associated with climate change. Insurance, they argue, can and should
act as a financial first responder to the changing climate by estimating and
‘pricing in’ risk, incentivizing mitigation, and unlocking recovery funds in
the wake of natural disasters. Reinsurers, meanwhile, are positioning them-
selves as a backup infrastructure for the rest of the financial sector. In a
world of more frequent and severe climate catastrophes, reinsurers claim that
their unique tools for ‘pricing’ potential catastrophes, and for defining their
likelihood, expected effects and costs, enable them to pool, mitigate and distri-
bute risks associated with climate change, as well as to act as a source of ‘knowl-
edge leadership’ (Collier & Cox, this issue) about emergent threats. In a series
of 2010 press releases, Munich Re asserted its own pride-of-place in climate
leadership, as a result of its ‘necessary know-how’ and its development of
‘the world’s most comprehensive database on natural catastrophes’. It charac-
terized climate change as ‘a strategic issue for the insurer’ and one about
which Munich Re (2010) could offer ‘advice on prevention measures’.
Climate change is also ‘opening up new business segments, creating opportu-
nities for the insurance industry’. As Lehtonen (2017, p. 33) observes, the
(re)insurance industry acts as ‘a mediating body that gives climate change a
shape and presence; it objectifies and commodifies climate change as an uncer-
tain phenomenon, yet presents it as manageable, at least to an extent’.
Some recent reports have viewed the potential role of private insurance in
managing the risks of climate change with a kind of breathless optimism, posit-
ing that where governmental and inter-governmental processes have failed,
insurance can provide both the finance for climate adaptation and instruments
to spread risk. ‘While politicians debate, Munich Re innovates’ ran a headline
from Forbes Magazine (Baskin, 2015), others proclaimed that ‘Insurance gains
clout as climate change solution for the poor’ (Rowling, 2015), and that a
‘Global insurance plan aims to defuse potential climate damage ‘bombshell’
(Carrington, 2017). Critics, meanwhile, have denounced the central role of
the private sector in insurance. The activist and author Naomi Klein (2015,
p. 9), for example, has charged that ‘global reinsurance companies are
making billions in profits, in part by selling new kinds of protection schemes
to developing countries that have done almost nothing to create the climate
crisis, but whose infrastructure is intensely vulnerable to its impacts’.
There is little doubt that, given their importance in making future risks a
matter of governance in the present, private insurance and reinsurance prom-
ises to play a central role in shaping how the effects of climate change are
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assessed and distributed. Yet, it seems much too early to characterize the form
of this connection in broad terms, or to render sweeping judgment about its
political significance. We are still at the earliest stages of adjustment of existing
insurance mechanisms, and of innovation in techniques, in response to chan-
ging risks. Moreover, new knowledge practices and techniques for risk mitiga-
tion have been put into practice only under highly selective circumstances. It is
difficult to predict whether the interest of private insurers in catastrophic risk
will be sustained, what kinds of risks will be covered, and, crucially, how private
insurance will interact with public mechanisms.
This special section makes two contributions to charting this still emergent
and rapidly changing field. First, the papers examine a set of exemplary geo-
graphical sites, institutional mechanisms and political issues in this field.
These range from micro-insurance and sovereign risk management in Africa
and the Caribbean, which have been central focal-points for many international
initiatives around insurance, to private and public insurance in the United
States, the country with by far the largest catastrophe insurance pools and
the largest volume of insured loss. Second, across these diverse institutions
and sites, the papers take insurance as a site for inquiring into larger problems
of social theory in the context of climate change, each in their own way exam-
ining how insurance is reformatting vulnerability and security as objects of gov-
ernmental management. They address questions such as: How is the role of
insurance as high finance related to the old promise of insurance as an instru-
ment for solidarity and for sharing responsibility? How are insurance schemes
structured by private and public agents such as municipal governments, private
businesses, national authorities, or global financial corporations? What role is
insurance playing in constituting climate change as a public problem?
Insurance and risk society: Beyond ‘insurability’ and ‘calculability’
The papers in this issue build on a longstanding critical social scientific inquiry
into insurance as a privileged site for understanding the changing politics of risk
and security in the face of catastrophic threats. This discussion was initiated 30
years ago by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck in his work on ‘risk society’.
Beck (1992 [1986]) observed that the traditional practices of insurance – asses-
sing and distributing risks based on observations about the historical occur-
rence of loss-making events – corresponded to certain kinds of events. The
risks of what Beck called ‘first modernity’, such as accidental death, workplace
injuries, or individual disease, exhibited regular patterns of occurrence across
geographically-bound populations. Therefore, they could be effectively
pooled and distributed over particular groups (of workers, citizens, etc.),
thus creating a form of security that corresponded to new forms of solidarity
in the emerging welfare states of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries (Ewald, 2019; Lehtonen & Liukko, 2011). But Beck (2002) argued that such
actuarial calculations and mechanisms of social solidarity could not function in
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a ‘second’ modernity dominated by ‘uncontrollable’ and ‘unbounded’ risks
such as nuclear war, mass casualty terrorism and ecological disaster. Such
risks, he argued, could not be subject to existing forms of expert assessment.
Moreover, given their wide geographic spread, they could not be distributed
over a population. Consequently, Beck claimed, insurance could be analysed
as an ‘autonomic signaling mechanism’ of a new stage of modernity. The
limits of insurance cover marked the boundaries of risk society.
In response to Beck’s initial claims about insurance and risk society, a
number of scholars pointed out that the line between the insurable risks of
‘first modernity’ and the uninsurable catastrophe risks of ‘second modernity’
did not hold up (Bougen, 2003; Collier, 2008; Ericson & Doyle, 2004a).
They documented ways in which private insurers have extended to catastrophe
risks employing both calculative and non-calculative techniques of risk assess-
ment (Ericson & Doyle, 2004b; Jarzabkowski et al., 2015).1 In response to these
arguments, Beck (2009) more recently qualified his claim. Pointing to the
example of terrorism insurance after 9/11, which was offered by private
insurers only after the creation of a public backstop, Beck (2009) acknowledged
that private insurance may be extended to catastrophes. But he anticipated that
such coverage would be both ‘selective’ and ‘fragile’, subject to cycles of expan-
sion, collapse and government bailout or other mechanisms to limit private risk.
Calling for the abandonment of the ‘unspoken functional premise of private
insurance’, Beck (2009, p. 138) argued that critical social science should
‘develop its own critical perspective on the simultaneous collapse and expan-
sion of private insurance coverage’.
Today, particularly in light of rapidly proliferating discussion of climate
change and insurance, Beck’s focus on insurance as a privileged site for inves-
tigating the changing politics of risk and security seems perspicacious. As we
will suggest in the next section, insurance does indeed illuminate key issues
of contemporary risk governance, such as the changing forms of expert risk
assessment, the interplay between public and private security mechanisms,
and the distribution of risk and responsibility in the face of multiplying cata-
strophic threats. Moreover, Beck’s (2009, p. 138) call to study the ‘simul-
taneous collapse and expansion’ of private insurance seems particularly apt
today. Discussions of catastrophe insurance are characterized equally by
urgent calls to dramatically expand insurance cover for climate-related risks
and warnings that, unless mitigation or adaptation measures are taken, existing
insurance arrangements may collapse, and the risks faced by certain populations
in certain geographical areas may become uninsurable.
At the same time, the emphasis in debates around risk society on the limits of
insurance in addressing catastrophe risks – and, in particular, their emphasis on
the technical calculability of catastrophe risk and the extension of private insur-
ance in particular to cover such risks – do not capture important emerging
issues in the field. In part, this is due to significant changes in the insurance
industry since the early 1990s that have made private insurers and others in
the financial services industry much more willing and able to assess and
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insure such risks. Furthermore, the emphasis on private insurance in this dis-
cussion seems one-sided. Virtually all catastrophe insurance involves the public
sector, whether as regulator, as the provider of backstops or reinsurance, or in
many cases as the consumer of private insurance products. Thus, to understand
the emerging assemblages of catastrophe insurance and climate change we have
to devote much more attention to the role of the public sector, including both
national and local governments and various inter-governmental and inter-
national organizations, and to ‘third sector’ organizations like major foun-
dations, as well as their dynamic relation to private insurance.
Approach and themes
In light of these developments, our strategy is to continue with Beck’s pro-
blems, but to capture important emerging issues in the field missed by an over-
riding emphasis on the limits of private insurance in addressing catastrophe
risks. What the collection does as a whole is map a terrain over which the
techno-politics of climate change – and, more broadly, the contemporary poli-
tics of risk and security – are getting worked out. We identify how political and
normative problems are specified through technical mechanisms of government
in a field that still has an ‘emergent’ quality to it. Thus, this special section is
dedicated less to describing (social and economic) structures, and more to iden-
tifying problems and dynamic sites in which things are taking shape. The
geography of the papers is necessarily selective, focusing on global sites in
which the role of insurance in governing climate change is growing, changing,
or most consequential. What the contributions to this special collection share,
then, is the premise that the way into larger questions about the politics of
climate change starts from specific practices and knowledge infrastructures.
At the same time, the papers are not so much ‘case studies’ as studies of situ-
ations that exemplify emerging forms of insurance-linked governance of
climate risk and of the problems to which they give rise. Three important
themes emerge from these studies.
The economization of climate change
In engaging with Beck on the limits to insurability, existing critical insurance
scholarship has focused on the commoditization of climate catastrophe risk.
It turns out that insurers, who are always confronting the limitations of their
own knowledge (Ericson & Doyle, 2004b), have indeed found ways to make
the threats and fears associated with climate change into marketizable risks,
that is, into things that are worth something (Jarzabkowski et al., 2015). A
suite of new risk assessment tools, most notably catastrophe modelling
(Collier, 2008; Johnson, 2013a), have become increasingly widespread and
authoritative (referred to in some cases as the ‘gold standard’ for catastrophe
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risk assessment). These tools make it possible for insurance to economize climate
change in particular ways (Çalisķan & Callon, 2009, 2010). A range of new risk
transfer mechanisms are changing the way that the insurance industry nar-
rowly, and the financial services more broadly, distributes catastrophic risks
(Aguiton, 2019; Jarzabkowski et al., 2015; Johnson, 2015). Through reinsurance
and various other risk transfer mechanisms, notably what are referred to as
‘alternative risk transfer’ instruments such as catastrophe bonds and other
insurance-linked securities, catastrophe risks are now distributed into vastly
larger pools of financial capital rather than over relatively small and geographi-
cally limited populations of policyholders (Christophers et al., 2020; Taylor,
2020). As a result of these changes, not only insurers but also other actors in
the financial services industry have been increasingly eager to take on cata-
strophe risks in a drive to develop new markets for primary insurance as well
as to meet (and profit from) the growing demand in broader financial
markets for investment instruments whose returns are not correlated with
other kinds of risk (Johnson, 2013b, 2015).
But there is more to economization, and to the insurance economization of
climate change, than marketization. Economization is also about the consti-
tution and formatting of calculative agencies: the ways in which actors are
made to take something into account in their decisions. Examples of this
appear across the papers. Collier and Cox, for instance, examine three mechan-
isms by which the private insurance industry formats contemporary urban resi-
lience initiatives in New York City, New Orleans and Miami: generating
knowledge about vulnerability, risk assessments and benefit–cost analysis of
resilience interventions for city officials; offering novel risk transfer mechan-
isms to urban governance actors; and diffusing devices that incorporate
future risks into current decisions. Johnson describes the operation of index
insurance in Africa, where international development agencies deploy it to
make climate change vulnerability manageable for different actors across
scales: from individual African farmers and pastoralists, to banks and contract
farming operations, to governments and relief organizations. Grove shows how,
in the Caribbean, contingency funds, parametric-based catastrophe insurance
products, and alternative risk transfer instruments, such as weather derivatives,
make it possible for the island nation of Dominica to budgetize disaster man-
agement decision-making processes. Through insurance, catastrophes are con-
stituted as events that generate contingent liabilities and that can and should be
planned in order to build the state’s financial capacity to meet post-disaster
obligations. Elliott examines the efforts of federal and local officials to take
climate change into account in the mapping techniques of the US National
Flood Insurance Program. Gray investigates how catastrophe modelling
firms first assessed climate science in the context of Florida hurricanes in an
effort to allow signals about ‘climate risk’ to begin working their way into the
market for property and casualty insurance, shifting individual behaviour
around decisions about where to build and purchase future homes. Across
these sites, we see how insurance renders climate change calculable and, in
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the process, makes actors accountable for climate change: not only conventional
insurance actors, like households buying flood policies, but also public agencies,
cities and sovereigns.
Relatedly, the insurance economization of climate change also involves par-
ticular work of framing through which, for example, a calculation of risk or
model is employed for one purpose rather than another. Gray’s catastrophe
modellers in Florida and Elliott’s local officials in New York City both want
to account for climate change in and through insurance tools. But how this is
ultimately allowed to proceed reflects distinct forms of contestation over
which view of risk can be used to govern which types of decision-making; in
both cases, views of risk multiply – leading to multiple models for Gray and
multiple maps for Elliott. In Grove’s study, insurantializing interventions in
Dominica emerge out of development economists’ moral and technical critique
of the ‘dependencies’ created by other forms of disaster financing. The critique
involves a reconceptualization of the relations between developing states,
donors, and markets in which Dominica is made to ‘plan like an insurer’.
These papers illustrate that today much of the debate around catastrophe
models and other insurance technologies is around how they should be taken
up for different political or governmental ends, not about whether it will be
possible to assess catastrophe risks for the purposes of insurance. Competing
views of problems and their appropriate responses circumscribe the operationa-
lization of insurantial knowledge about climate change.
The moral economy of risk and responsibility
Calculative agencies are also formatted politically and morally. By rendering
climate change calculable, insurance renders actors responsible. As an interdis-
ciplinary scholarship has shown, insurance establishes social relations of various
kinds: among individuals, among individuals and institutions, and among indi-
viduals, states and markets. It ‘define[s] the contours of individual and social
responsibility’ (Baker, 1996, p. 291) by forging solidarities that include and
exclude, and by shaping ideas of membership and mutual obligation (Collier,
2014; Elliott, 2021; Ericson & Doyle, 2003; Ewald, 1991, 2019; Heimer,
2003; Lehtonen & Liukko, 2015; Stone, 2002). The papers in this collection
excavate the stakes of insurance in relation to the moral economy of risk and
responsibility as they appear in the context of climate change: issues of who
has to take responsibility for climate risk, when, how much and on what
terms. Elliott shows that in New York City what is at stake in mapping
climate risk is whether or the extent to which homeowners should be made
to pay, now, for climate change through their insurance. For Gray, failure to
achieve agreement about hurricane model updates in Florida sheds light on
the ways that climate change repoliticizes technical issues of risk distribution
and raises questions about who should bear the burden of future climate
impacts in the present day. These debates over the intertemporal bearing of
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costs highlight that questions of how to delimit a risk pool, price a risk, or
specify an insurance contract are necessarily and simultaneously technical
and moral. In addition, the papers show how, in formatting and assigning
responsibilities across actors and scales, insurance also specifies how burdens
and benefits in a climate-changed world are distributed. For instance,
Johnson observes that it is primarily those without other forms of financial
security in poor countries who are compelled to experiment with the imperfect
coverage offered by index-based contracts, a ‘second best’ option relative to
those available to wealthier populations and countries.
An emergent dimension to this moral economy is the relationship between
public and private, a distinction which preoccupied Beck but, in our work,
does not always seem so clear and operative. Across the landscape we survey,
the government of catastrophe risk is taking shape through complex loops of
private and public security mechanisms. In the urban resilience policy space
mapped by Collier and Cox, a variety of institutional actors are deploying
private insurance not as an alternative to public measures, but rather as a mech-
anism of public intervention. City officials, policymakers and insurance indus-
try experts in New York City, New Orleans and Miami do not seek to displace
or privatize public security, but rather are turning to private insurance as a way
to advance work on urban resilience as a public problem. Problems of moral
hazard, particularly where public insurance underprices catastrophe risk,
have led local jurisdictions to seek out ex-ante finance mechanisms in the
private insurance industry. Limitations on ex-post disaster finance have led gov-
ernments, notably in poor countries, to do the same, as Grove’s work in the
Caribbean and Johnson’s work in Africa attest. Moreover, private coverage of
catastrophe risks is almost universally hemmed in by various kinds of public
sector regulations, as is evident from Gray’s discussion of the contentious
relationship between catastrophe modelling firms and state-level insurance reg-
ulators shows. The papers examine the different ways that private and public
mechanisms are articulated with each other, to assess the political and social
stakes of these new forms of calculation and mitigation.
The plasticity of the insurance imaginary across scale and space
There is nothing inherent in insurance that indicates the kind of political
project in which it is enlisted. As Ewald (1991) observed, the ‘insurance ima-
ginary’ can be put to a variety of uses, in pursuit of different goals. The
papers in this special collection examine diverse climate-related problems for
which insurance becomes a solution, focusing not only on the technical
details of insurance but also on the very different political contexts in which
it is taken up. Johnson documents the rapid multiplication of both the insuran-
tial imaginaries harnessed to index insurance and the configurations of risks
thereby transferred. As development actors and insurers redesign index insur-
ance to engage risk pools at different scales, the core technology of the index
168 Economy and Society
remains alluring as an appropriate ‘solution’ to various humanitarian, welfare
and commercial problems, even in the face of consistently low demand and con-
tractual inaccuracy. Grove examines how the developing state government of
Dominica takes up ex-ante risk management in response to the contextually-
specific problems that climate change impacts pose to its development and dis-
aster management goals. In more affluent contexts in the United States, exam-
ined by Elliott, Collier and Cox, and Gray, insurance is more about protecting
property investments in a political context in which the politics of land use and
social provision are intertwined, as well as financing public infrastructure and
investments in resilience measures.
These cases speak to the plasticity of insurance rationality and help to explain
why so many different actors are looking to insurance to govern climate change.
They also underscore that ‘insurance’ is not one coherent thing, nor does it
work in one way only. Taken together, the papers in this special collection
show that the precise effects of insurance on lives and landscapes will
depend on how it is harnessed to, and how it reconfigures, the various interven-
tions that target individual and collective security as the climate continues to
change.
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Notes
1 Moreover, scholars have shown that these practices for assessing catastrophic risk
are not new (e.g. Haueter & Jones, 2016; James et al., 2013).
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